Draft. Work in progress: an outline with working notes. The finished post will replace it.

/ cloud, aws, offensive-security

Pentesting cloud IAM as a graph problem

Roles, trust policies, STS and cross-account access form a graph. Testing it means finding paths, not misconfigurations.

A list of IAM findings rarely shows the real risk. The risk is in the paths: this role can assume that one, which can read this secret, which unlocks that account. Cloud identity is a graph, and testing it well means walking it.

Nodes and edges

  • Nodes: principals, roles, resources, accounts.
  • Edges: trust policies, permissions, role assumption, resource policies.
  • [TODO: synthetic diagram]

Starting from an assumed breach

  • What the compromised workload can see first: metadata, credentials, its own permissions.
  • [TODO: enumeration approach, generic]

Finding paths

  • Privilege escalation edges.
  • Cross-account trust.
  • [TODO: approach and tooling, no client detail]

Reporting paths, not findings

  • Show the chain end to end.
  • Recommend the cut that breaks the most paths.
  • [TODO: synthetic example of a path write-up]

cd ../writing