Operator checklist
Actions only the repository owner takes. An agent must not take any of them: agents never change repository or account settings, push tags, publish, or merge (Releasing). Several controls in Security controls depend on these settings being in place, and no test in this repository can see them. Record the result of each change (the settings' JSON) as evidence.
Repository settings (GitHub)
.github/expected-settings.json is the declared policy: each item below is a field there. Apply
the setting in GitHub first, then change the file in a reviewed pull request; never the other way
round.
- [ ]
mainruleset: pull requests with one approving review, code-owner review, approval of the last push, stale reviews dismissed, review threads resolved; force pushes and deletion blocked; the owner may bypass only through a pull request (rulesets[main].rules.pull_request,bypass_actors). - [ ] Required checks on
main: exactly therequired_status_checkslist, bound to the GitHub Actions app (and the CodeQL check to code scanning), with the strict up-to-date policy.ci-completestands for every job inci.ymlexcept the measure-onlycoverageandcoverage-mergejobs, so a new CI job needs no ruleset change. - [ ] Code-scanning merge protection: the
code_scanningrule with the thresholds listed for CodeQL, Semgrep OSS, OSV-Scanner and zizmor. - [ ] Release tags: only the owner creates, updates or deletes
v*tags (rulesets[release-tags]). - [ ] Actions: only selected actions, SHA pinning required, and exactly the
actions.patterns_allowedlist; the default workflow token read-only, and Actions unable to approve pull requests (workflow_permissions). Bump procedure: CI security. - [ ] Fork pull requests need approval to run workflows for all external contributors
(
fork_pr_approval_policy). - [ ] Security and analysis: secret scanning, push protection, Dependabot alerts and Dependabot
security updates (
security_and_analysis,vulnerability_alerts), and private vulnerability reporting forSECURITY.md. Non-provider patterns and validity checks stay off: they need GitHub Secret Protection, which this repository does not have, and GitHub ignores a request to enable them. - [ ] The
npmenvironment, before any npm publication: a required reviewer and a deployment policy forv*tags (environments.npm). Bind the npm trusted publisher to it (Releasing). - [ ] GitHub Pages, for the website: Settings → Pages → Source: GitHub Actions. This creates the
github-pagesenvironment; keep its deployment branch rule tomainonly (environments.github-pages, Website). - [ ] Bot and App identities: each has only the permissions its job needs, is not a bypass actor, and cannot approve pull requests. Agents push as such an identity, never as the owner.
- [ ] Stray branches: review and delete branches nobody owns.
Before each release, compare the live settings with .github/expected-settings.json using the
maintainers' read-only drift check (npm run settings:check -- --json), run with an administrator's login, and keep its JSON output
with the release.
Release credentials and publication
Releases are prepared directly in GitHub SATUNIX/luna, the only repository
(Releasing). The GitLab mirror and private-lineage export
pipeline are archived.
- [ ] Agent forge credentials are least privilege: contents and pull-request write access only, no administration or runner scopes, and never an administrator's token. Administrators use two-factor authentication.
- [ ] Only the operator tags and publishes. Review the release branch through a pull request,
then run the manual release workflow first as a dry run
(
tests/release-plan-smoke.ts,tests/release-workflow-smoke.ts).
Each release
The release steps are in Releasing. In addition:
- [ ] The release pull request had a human approval and every required check passed.
- [ ] If the release changes the scan exceptions, an exceptions-only pull request was
reviewed entry by entry and merged first; the release
branch was then updated from
mainand itsleak-scanre-ran and passed.leak-scanis never bypassed or made optional for a release (Releasing). - [ ] The release workflow ran first as a dry run, and its plan was read.
- [ ] Open Dependabot and code-scanning alerts were triaged (Vulnerability management), and the risk-acceptance register is current.
Remote control and the consoles
- [ ] Bind the remote host to
tailscaleorloopback(PI_REMOTE_BIND) unless every-interface access is needed (Remote control). - [ ] Turn on the app lock on each linked phone; it is off by default.
- [ ] Review
/remote devicesfrom time to time and revoke phones you no longer use.
After an incident
Follow Incident response; rotating a leaked credential always comes first.