Vulnerability management

How the maintainers find, rate, fix or accept vulnerabilities in Luna and in what it depends on. Reporting is in SECURITY.md at the repository root; what happens when something is already being exploited or has leaked is in Incident response.

Sources

Source What it finds Where it reports Blocks a merge?
Private vulnerability reports Anything a person finds GitHub Security Advisories (private) n/a
npm audit and npm audit signatures Advisories and missing or invalid registry signatures in every npm lockfile security.yml dependencies job Yes, high and critical (CI security)
OSV-Scanner Known vulnerabilities in every manifest in the tree osv-scanner job and the Security tab Yes
Dependency review A pull request that adds a dependency with a high-severity advisory dependency-review job Yes, pull requests only
Dependabot alerts and security updates Advisories against the default branch Security tab and pull requests No: an alert is triaged here; its update pull request is gated like any other
CodeQL, Semgrep, zizmor Code and workflow weaknesses Their jobs and the Security tab The jobs, yes; Security-tab alerts only through code-scanning merge protection (CI security)
gitleaks, the leak scan, GitHub secret scanning Secrets and private identifiers Their jobs, the pre-push hook, push protection Yes
Property-based fuzz tests Inputs that break a classifier, redactor or path property: a wrong tier, a surviving secret, a write outside the workspace, a crash check:all (fixed seed) and the weekly fuzz job (random seed) (CI security) Yes, in check:all; the weekly run reports a failure for triage
OpenSSF Scorecard Supply-chain posture Security tab; the weekly threshold run No (CI security)
Image scans (Trivy) of the container, autonomy and role-runner images Operating-system and bundled-package advisories Run by a maintainer when an image changes No: nothing in CI scans images

Owner

The repository owner (@SATUNIX, the owner of every security path in .github/CODEOWNERS) owns triage, the severity decision, the fix and the advisory. Contributors and agents may prepare a fix on a branch; only the owner merges it and releases it (Releasing).

Severity

Severity Meaning in this project Examples of the class
Critical An agent or a remote party gains operator authority or credentials with no operator action, in a shipped profile's default configuration A tool call that forges an approval; a release credential readable by an agent
High A high or critical action runs at a lower tier, or a documented control can be bypassed by content the agent reads An unmodelled shell construct that hides a write to the firewall policy; a state write that follows a committed link
Medium A control is weaker than documented, needs an unusual configuration or another precondition to exploit, or leaks information that does not grant authority A redactor missing a common secret shape; a scanner that passes over a manifest
Low Defence in depth, hardening, or a documentation claim that overstates a control A missing file mode on a non-secret file

Dependency advisories start from their CVSS or GitHub severity, then move up or down by whether the vulnerable code is reachable in Luna: a development-only tool, or code Luna never calls, is usually rated lower; a package the shipped kit runs is rated as published.

The fix targets for each severity are in SECURITY.md ("Response targets"): no confirmed vulnerability of medium or higher severity is left unfixed for more than 60 days after it is reported. A finding from one of the project's own tools above (CodeQL, Semgrep, zizmor, the dependency scanners, the fuzz tests) that the owner confirms as medium or higher gets the same targets, counted from the day it is confirmed; a finding the owner rates as not a vulnerability is closed with the reason, or suppressed under the suppression policy.

Fix or accept

Every finding ends in one of three states:

  1. Fixed: a release contains the fix and its regression test, and the CHANGELOG entry under Security names the test. A fuzz counterexample is kept as a fixed case in the matching example-based suite, so it is checked on every run whatever seed the fuzz tests use.
  2. Not affected: the vulnerable code is not shipped or not reachable; the reason is recorded in the pull request that closes the alert or in the review entry in packages/core/sources.json for a companion.
  3. Accepted: no fix is available or the fix costs more than the risk. The finding goes into the register below with an owner and the event that triggers the next review. An accepted risk is never hidden from a scanner: the scanner still reports it, and the register says why it is not failing a gate.

A scanner suppression (a nosemgrep, a gitleaks allowlist, a CodeQL query filter) is a separate decision with its own policy (CI security); it is never used to accept a dependency advisory.

Risk-acceptance register

Finding Where Why it is accepted Mitigation Owner Review when
Debian 13 package advisories with no fixed version (util-linux, curl, brotli, python3.13, perl, ncurses, systemd libraries, acl, the setuptools wheel) The autonomy image (node:26-trixie-slim base and its packages) Debian has published no fix (status affected or fix_deferred) The image installs every package from the current archive when built, so a rebuild picks up each fix; workers have no network apart from the inference relay and the egress proxy (Autonomous runs) @SATUNIX Every image rebuild, and when Debian ships a fix
braces 3.0.3 in bash-language-server and markdownlint-cli2 The autonomy image's pi-lens tools No fixed release exists The tools run inside the worker container only @SATUNIX When either tool releases a fix
Go standard-library and module advisories in the upstream gitleaks v8.30.1 binary security.yml gitleaks job Building gitleaks from source in every secret-scanning job would add a Go toolchain build; the autonomy image already builds it from source In CI it reads only the checked-out repository @SATUNIX When gitleaks publishes a release built with a current Go
Vendored MCP client bundle in pi-lean-ctx An opt-in companion Audit tools cannot see a vendored bundle Not in any profile; the review in packages/core/sources.json records the bundle's SDK version @SATUNIX Every pi-lean-ctx version bump

The container and role-runner images (Alpine) carry no such findings. Trivy is run by a maintainer, not in CI, so this register is checked by hand when an image changes.

Disclosure

A fix for a reported vulnerability ships with a GitHub Security Advisory (SECURITY.md). A finding the maintainers found themselves, with no released version affected, is described in the CHANGELOG only. Advisories describe the class of the problem, the affected versions, the fix and any mitigation, never a working exploit.