Vulnerability management
How the maintainers find, rate, fix or accept vulnerabilities in Luna and in what it
depends on. Reporting is in SECURITY.md at the repository root; what happens when something is
already being exploited or has leaked is in Incident response.
Sources
| Source | What it finds | Where it reports | Blocks a merge? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private vulnerability reports | Anything a person finds | GitHub Security Advisories (private) | n/a |
npm audit and npm audit signatures |
Advisories and missing or invalid registry signatures in every npm lockfile | security.yml dependencies job |
Yes, high and critical (CI security) |
| OSV-Scanner | Known vulnerabilities in every manifest in the tree | osv-scanner job and the Security tab |
Yes |
| Dependency review | A pull request that adds a dependency with a high-severity advisory | dependency-review job |
Yes, pull requests only |
| Dependabot alerts and security updates | Advisories against the default branch | Security tab and pull requests | No: an alert is triaged here; its update pull request is gated like any other |
| CodeQL, Semgrep, zizmor | Code and workflow weaknesses | Their jobs and the Security tab | The jobs, yes; Security-tab alerts only through code-scanning merge protection (CI security) |
| gitleaks, the leak scan, GitHub secret scanning | Secrets and private identifiers | Their jobs, the pre-push hook, push protection | Yes |
| Property-based fuzz tests | Inputs that break a classifier, redactor or path property: a wrong tier, a surviving secret, a write outside the workspace, a crash | check:all (fixed seed) and the weekly fuzz job (random seed) (CI security) |
Yes, in check:all; the weekly run reports a failure for triage |
| OpenSSF Scorecard | Supply-chain posture | Security tab; the weekly threshold run | No (CI security) |
| Image scans (Trivy) of the container, autonomy and role-runner images | Operating-system and bundled-package advisories | Run by a maintainer when an image changes | No: nothing in CI scans images |
Owner
The repository owner (@SATUNIX, the owner of every security path in .github/CODEOWNERS) owns
triage, the severity decision, the fix and the advisory. Contributors and agents may prepare a
fix on a branch; only the owner merges it and releases it (Releasing).
Severity
| Severity | Meaning in this project | Examples of the class |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | An agent or a remote party gains operator authority or credentials with no operator action, in a shipped profile's default configuration | A tool call that forges an approval; a release credential readable by an agent |
| High | A high or critical action runs at a lower tier, or a documented control can be bypassed by content the agent reads | An unmodelled shell construct that hides a write to the firewall policy; a state write that follows a committed link |
| Medium | A control is weaker than documented, needs an unusual configuration or another precondition to exploit, or leaks information that does not grant authority | A redactor missing a common secret shape; a scanner that passes over a manifest |
| Low | Defence in depth, hardening, or a documentation claim that overstates a control | A missing file mode on a non-secret file |
Dependency advisories start from their CVSS or GitHub severity, then move up or down by whether the vulnerable code is reachable in Luna: a development-only tool, or code Luna never calls, is usually rated lower; a package the shipped kit runs is rated as published.
The fix targets for each severity are in SECURITY.md ("Response targets"): no confirmed
vulnerability of medium or higher severity is left unfixed for more than 60 days after it is
reported. A finding from one of the project's own tools above (CodeQL, Semgrep, zizmor, the
dependency scanners, the fuzz tests) that the owner confirms as medium or higher gets the same
targets, counted from the day it is confirmed; a finding the owner rates as not a vulnerability is
closed with the reason, or suppressed under the suppression policy.
Fix or accept
Every finding ends in one of three states:
- Fixed: a release contains the fix and its regression test, and the CHANGELOG entry under Security names the test. A fuzz counterexample is kept as a fixed case in the matching example-based suite, so it is checked on every run whatever seed the fuzz tests use.
- Not affected: the vulnerable code is not shipped or not reachable; the reason is recorded
in the pull request that closes the alert or in the review entry in
packages/core/sources.jsonfor a companion. - Accepted: no fix is available or the fix costs more than the risk. The finding goes into the register below with an owner and the event that triggers the next review. An accepted risk is never hidden from a scanner: the scanner still reports it, and the register says why it is not failing a gate.
A scanner suppression (a nosemgrep, a gitleaks allowlist, a CodeQL query filter) is a separate
decision with its own policy (CI security); it is never used
to accept a dependency advisory.
Risk-acceptance register
| Finding | Where | Why it is accepted | Mitigation | Owner | Review when |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 13 package advisories with no fixed version (util-linux, curl, brotli, python3.13, perl, ncurses, systemd libraries, acl, the setuptools wheel) | The autonomy image (node:26-trixie-slim base and its packages) |
Debian has published no fix (status affected or fix_deferred) |
The image installs every package from the current archive when built, so a rebuild picks up each fix; workers have no network apart from the inference relay and the egress proxy (Autonomous runs) | @SATUNIX |
Every image rebuild, and when Debian ships a fix |
braces 3.0.3 in bash-language-server and markdownlint-cli2 |
The autonomy image's pi-lens tools | No fixed release exists | The tools run inside the worker container only | @SATUNIX |
When either tool releases a fix |
| Go standard-library and module advisories in the upstream gitleaks v8.30.1 binary | security.yml gitleaks job |
Building gitleaks from source in every secret-scanning job would add a Go toolchain build; the autonomy image already builds it from source | In CI it reads only the checked-out repository | @SATUNIX |
When gitleaks publishes a release built with a current Go |
Vendored MCP client bundle in pi-lean-ctx |
An opt-in companion | Audit tools cannot see a vendored bundle | Not in any profile; the review in packages/core/sources.json records the bundle's SDK version |
@SATUNIX |
Every pi-lean-ctx version bump |
The container and role-runner images (Alpine) carry no such findings. Trivy is run by a maintainer, not in CI, so this register is checked by hand when an image changes.
Disclosure
A fix for a reported vulnerability ships with a GitHub Security Advisory (SECURITY.md). A
finding the maintainers found themselves, with no released version affected, is described in the
CHANGELOG only. Advisories describe the class of the problem, the affected versions, the fix and
any mitigation, never a working exploit.